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INTRODUCTION
“The vast expansion of our national economy during the past
several decades has provided the primary rationale for expanding the
permissible reach of a State’s jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”1
General jurisdiction is slowly being eroded. What was once a welltrodden path used to hale corporate defendants into the courthouse is now
increasingly barred or shut. In its most recent general jurisdiction opinion,
Daimler AG v. Bauman,2 the U.S. Supreme Court continued its trend
towards divesting general jurisdiction of its utility. This is a mistake. The
21st century’s economy is increasingly complex, and general jurisdiction
must evolve with this complexity. Failing to do so allows intricate corporate
structures to insulate corporate defendants from the jurisdiction of U.S
courts. Although the theory of personal jurisdiction has come a long way
since the landmark decisions in Pennoyer v. Neff3and International Shoe v.
Washington,4 it must continue to evolve. Arguably, another catalytic
opinion is needed to belatedly nudge general jurisdiction into modernity.
This note explores the history of general jurisdiction, provides a
means to satisfy the currently rigorous general jurisdiction standard, and
proposes a new standard that is more cogent in the modern age. In doing so,
Part I of this note explains the theory behind general jurisdiction and how it
differs from specific jurisdiction, and Part II describes the history of the
Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction jurisprudence since Pennoyer. After
examining the theory of general jurisdiction and Supreme Court precedent
on the issue, Part III traces the steps of the Daimler case, from the Northern
District of California to the Supreme Court, with each courts’ nuances
highlighted. Part IV then explains the necessary steps plaintiffs must take to
satisfy the new rigors of general jurisdiction. Finally, Part V provides a new
definition and standard of general jurisdiction, one that will hopefully be
more consistent with the original theory of general jurisdiction that was first
outlined in Pennoyer and International Shoe.

1. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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I. THEORY OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is essentially the power of a court over persons and
things.5 More specifically, personal jurisdiction is defined as a “court’s
power to bring a person into its adjudicative process.”6 Most, if not all, of
the cases on personal jurisdiction, however, define the term by focusing on
the interplay of two rights: the right of a sovereign state to exercise proper
jurisdiction over persons within its borders, and the right of an individual to
have life, liberty and property protected by due process of law.7 In practice,
states use long-arm statutes to subject persons both within and without the
state to the jurisdiction of its courts.8 It is the prerogative of the courts to
decide if such exercises of personal jurisdiction comport with the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.9
State long-arm statutes differ.10 Some statutes extend the
jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by the Due Process Clause.11 Other
statutes are more nuanced and delineate the situations in which a person’s
conduct will subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state.12
This section on the theory of general jurisdiction is intended to
serve several purposes. First, understanding the theory of personal
jurisdiction is instructive for defining the appropriate scope of general
jurisdiction. To do this, an exploration of background principles of personal
5. Jurisdiction is defined as “[a] government’s general power to exercise authority
over all persons and things within its territory; esp., a state’s power to create interests that
will be recognized under common-law principles as valid in other states.” Jurisdiction,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
6. Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed, 2014). Black’s Law
Dictionary further defines personal jurisdiction as “jurisdiction over a defendant’s personal
rights, rather than merely over property interests.” Id.
7. Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do With It? Due Process,
Personal Jurisdiction, & the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729–30 (2012).
8. See generally 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: CIVIL LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE,
PERSONAL JURISDICTION, 0020 SURVEYS 10 (Westlaw 2015) [hereinafter STATE SURVEYS]
(“Generally, a court has personal jurisdiction over the residents of the state in which the
court is situated. Each state has a ‘longarm’ [sic] statute, which specifies the circumstances
under which a nonresident may be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.”).
9. See Eric C. Hawkins, General Jurisdiction & Internet Contacts: What Role, if Any,
Should the Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2371, 2372.
The theory of judicial review found in Marbury v. Madison provides the rationale for the
federal courts’ role of defining the scope of the Due Process Clause. Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)., 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
10. See STATE SURVEYS, supra note 8.
11. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (“A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States.”).
12. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 209D § 2-201 (West 1988).
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jurisdiction is needed. Second, this section discusses the actual theory of
general jurisdiction: where it comes from and what it does. Third, this
section explains the main rationales for general jurisdiction. Although many
scholars have argued that general jurisdiction is obsolete and unworkable in
today’s world,13 such a conclusion is shortsighted. At least
Justice Sotomayor of the Roberts Court has reason to believe that general
jurisdiction is alive and well, and should be preserved.14 By ensuring that
general jurisdiction is, indeed, alive and well, the Court will prevent
corporate defendants from unfairly avoiding the jurisdiction of state
courts.15
A. Personal Jurisdiction Principles
At its core, personal jurisdiction is “simple and elegant.”16
Describing this simplicity, Professor Simoni Grassi notes that personal
jurisdiction is based on two fundamental ideas: connecting factors and
reasonable expectations.17 However, the Supreme Court has not been
entirely successful at articulating the law of personal jurisdiction in
conjunction with this theory.18 This sub-section attempts to outline the
theory of personal jurisdiction.
The core of the contemporary theory of personal jurisdiction can be
traced to Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman’s oft-cited
article, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate.19 The heart of their theory is thus:
In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and
the underlying controversy normally support only the
power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or
connected with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction.
On the other hand, American practice for the most part is to
exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when
jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect,

13. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
610 (1988).
14. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763–73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
15. See id. at 772–73.
16. Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No Exit,
47 AKRON L. REV. 617, 618 (2014).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
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between the forum and the person or persons whose legal
rights are to be affected. This we call general jurisdiction.20
As the Court has developed the doctrine of personal jurisdiction
over the last half-century, it has approvingly cited von Mehren and
Trautman, specifically this paragraph.21
In the last 30 years, Professors Lea Brilmayer and Mary Twitchell
have led the debate over personal jurisdiction.22 Portions of this scholarly
debate concern even the terms used in describing personal jurisdiction. For
example, Brilmayer states the following:
Rather than using the terms “general” and “specific,”
which she thinks mislead courts and scholars, [Professor
Twitchell] would have us use the terms “dispute-blind” and
“dispute-specific.” Dispute-blind jurisdiction exists when a
court would have adjudicative jurisdiction over any cause
of action whatsoever the defendant, or at least, as she
sometimes qualifies this, over “most” disputes. A finding
of dispute-specific jurisdiction, in contrast does not compel
the conclusion that jurisdiction would exist in most or all
other cases; instead, as Professor Twitchell sometimes
states, it takes the “nature” of the dispute into account.23
Essentially, Twitchell and Brilmayer are attempting to make sense
of the Court’s often confusing personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.24
There are numerous articles that outline the theory of specific
personal jurisdiction (or Twitchell’s “dispute-specific” jurisdiction).25 But
20. Id. at 1136.
21. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
22. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1444, n.a1 (1998) (“The author wishes to thank Professor Twitchell for good humor
and scholarly openness that is rarely encountered in such response/rejoinder episodes.”); Lea
Brilmayer, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988); Mary
Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988).
23. Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 22, at 1446
(citing Twitchell, supra note 13, at 613, 637).
24. See generally Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note
22; Brilmayer, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, supra note 22; Twitchell, supra note
13.
25. See, e.g., James M. Brogan, Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear & McIntyre
One Step Forward; One Step Backward?, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 811 (2013); Braham Boyce
Ketcham, Related Contacts For Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants:
Adopting a Two-Part Test, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 477 (2009); Linda
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the focus of this note is general jurisdiction.26 Therefore, regarding
background principles, all that need be remembered is this: For a court to
exercise specific in personam jurisdiction, the lawsuit must arise out of
“minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state.27 More
importantly, the delineation between general and specific jurisdiction “has
helped courts focus on their reasons for exercising jurisdiction in particular
cases.”28
Regarding personal jurisdiction as a whole, Professor Twitchell
notes that there are a number of approaches to the conceptual framework of
personal jurisdiction that are somewhat inconsistent with the original
meaning of general and specific jurisdiction.29 She identifies two factors as
the source of this problem: (1) courts are unsure of the meaning of general
and specific jurisdiction and (2) courts are unsure of how to use the generalversus-specific framework to determine when it is fair to exercise
jurisdiction.30 The result of this confusion is what Twitchell calls:
An impoverished body of general jurisdiction case law that
fails to explore the question of the state’s general
adjudicatory power over nonresident defendants, and an
impoverished body of specific jurisdiction case law that
fails to recognize that courts often exercise what is, in fact,
specific jurisdiction over claims only tenuously tied to a
defendant’s forum contacts.31
This note attempts to make sense of this “impoverished body of
general jurisdiction case law” and provide a reasonable understanding of
general jurisdiction that fits in the framework of contemporary
jurisprudence. The theory of general jurisdiction is extremely important in
building a coherent general jurisdiction framework. That theory is discussed
next.

Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1619 (2001).
26. Reference the relative definitions, supra notes 5 & 6.
27. This is the hallmark language of Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945). For a more detailed discussion of specific jurisdiction, the articles mentioned supra
at note 22 provide an excellent starting point.
28. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 611.
29. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 612.
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B. General Jurisdiction Theory
In her influential article, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,
Professor Twitchell explains much of the theory supporting modern-day
general jurisdiction jurisprudence.32 Although she uses the term “disputeblind” instead of general jurisdiction and “dispute-specific” instead of
personal jurisdiction, she views those terms as interchangeable. The same
premise applies here.
Before the 21st century and the modern understanding of personal
jurisdiction, American courts defined jurisdiction in terms of the
“sovereign’s relationship with the defendant or his property, rather than in
terms of character of the suit itself.”33 During this time, the justification for
personal jurisdiction existed solely on the criteria that define modern-day
general jurisdiction.34 Twitchell notes, “As international and interstate
commercial relations grew more extensive in the mid-nineteenth century,
the nature of the dispute began to play a more prominent role
in . . . American jurisdiction decisions.”35 Notably, this movement produced
serious concern regarding one particular type of party: corporate
defendants.36 This development culminated in the landmark decision of
Pennoyer v. Neff, which Twitchell points to as the source of the disputeblind and dispute-specific bases of personal jurisdiction.37 Initially, the
delineations of general jurisdiction expanded as states developed rules
allowing jurisdiction over corporate defendants based on the corporation’s
“consent, doing business, or presence” in the state.38 After International
Shoe,39 however, leading commentators read the proverbial writing on the
wall and predicted that general jurisdiction would take a backseat to
specific jurisdiction.40 Nonetheless, International Shoe provided not only
32. See Twitchell, supra note 13.
33. Id. at 615.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 618.
36. Id. at 619, n.39 (“Some states and territories made foreign corporations subject to
process if they had officers or agents in the forum or were doing business there . . . .
However, the accepted doctrine that a corporation had no existence beyond the state of its
incorporation . . . led other early nineteenth-century commentators and jurists to conclude
that it could not be subject to personal jurisdiction elsewhere.”).
37. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 619–20. Professor Twitchell goes on to say: “The
dominant theme of Pennoyer was that a state has absolute power over defendants or property
found within its territorial boundaries, regardless of the nature of the dispute. Nevertheless,
the Court in Pennoyer acknowledged that a state has some power to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants based on the state’s interest in the particular suit.” Id.
38. Id. at 622.
39. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1164. Specifically, those authors
wrote that “the landscape that we have surveyed will gradually change; in particular, specific
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the theoretical framework for the continued existence of personal
jurisdiction but also a nuanced “fairness rationale” that has dominated
modern-day personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.41
As the doctrine of personal jurisdiction progressed, “courts
developed rules permitting jurisdiction over disputes closely related to the
forum but framed them in ways that paid lip service to general jurisdiction
requirements.”42 But at its root, general jurisdiction is uniquely focused on
the “nature of the contacts between the defendant and the forum.”43 This
doctrine is juxtaposed with specific jurisdiction, which is focused on the
“relationship between the forum and the dispute being litigated.”44 And, as
Professors von Mehren and Trautman predicted, “specific jurisdiction has
become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory, while general
jurisdiction plays a reduced role.”45
Despite that reduced role, the difference between general and
specific jurisdiction is the focus of the inquiry. Specific jurisdiction
examines the connection between the facts of the controversy and the
lawsuit in question. General jurisdiction, however, examines the
relationship between the defendant and the forum. Essentially, some
defendants have such a close relationship with a forum that it would be
patently unfair to insulate them from the jurisdiction of the forum’s courts,
with no concern as to the forum’s interest in the facts of the case.46 Whereas
specific jurisdiction may be focused on fairness to the defendant, general
jurisdiction focuses on fairness to the forum. This theory echoes the theory
of estoppel.47
Unexpectedly, Professor Twitchell presents several problems with
general jurisdiction, as well as several reasons for the endurance of general
jurisdiction.48 As to the problems, Twitchell admits: (1) “general
jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and form a considerably more significant part of the
scene.” Id. As history would have it, they were right.
41. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 625. A pertinent section of the International Shoe
opinion states: “[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 318. This “fairness” rationale provides support for an expansive view of general
jurisdiction.
42. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 622.
43. Id. at 627.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19.
46. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
47. In other words, there are some situations in which it would be unfair to not require
a defendant to answer a lawsuit in a particular jurisdiction, mirroring the rationale for
estoppel (i.e., requiring a defendant to do something that it would be unfair for him to not
do).
48. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 629–33.
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jurisdiction is outdated” and (2) “courts have no clear concept of what
general jurisdiction is or how it relates to specific jurisdiction.”49 As to the
endurance, or hardiness, of general jurisdiction, Twitchell recognizes that:
(1) it fills a gap left by other jurisdictional theories; (2) it is innocuous;
(3) it encompasses foreseeable exercises of jurisdiction; (4) it has been
preserved by the judiciary; and (5) personal jurisdiction alone is
inadequate.50
General jurisdiction has been divided into four main categories or
paradigms.51 First, there are “unique affiliations” that are in many ways the
heart of general jurisdiction.52 The three types of unique affiliations—
domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of business—decide
many questions of personal jurisdiction in modern day legal practice.53
Professor Brilmayer notes, “Domicile is the place with which a person has a
settled connection for certain legal purposes, either because the person’s
home is there or because the law assigns this significance to that place.”54
Since the “law treats corporations like legal persons . . . the place of
incorporation and the principal place of business are both analogous to
domicile.”55
Second, the defendant’s activities in the forum state can serve as a
basis for general jurisdiction.56 However, this type of jurisdiction requires a
more nuanced analysis. Although a “single activity may suffice to establish
general jurisdiction,” some level of “continuous and systematic activities”
is generally required.57 Third, and more controversially, transient
jurisdiction may exist because of an “individual’s mere presence in the state
for service of process.”58 Fourth, a party may always consent to personal
jurisdiction, since it is a waivable affirmative defense.59

49. Id. at 629.
50. Id. at 632.
51. See Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 728–71.
52. Id. at 728.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 734.
56. Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 735.
57. Id. at 735–36.
58. Id. at 748.
59. Id. at 755. Professor Brilmayer also delves into the world of in rem and quasi in
rem jurisdiction as forms of general jurisdiction. For purposes of this article, however, the
nuances and intricacies of in rem jurisdiction need not be explored at length.
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C. Rationale for General Jurisdiction
A lawsuit based on general jurisdiction typically “involves the
adjudication of a controversy that is centered outside the forum.”60 This
means that the defendant must have a significant relationship with the
forum such that notions of due process are justified61 and use of that
relationship must comport with “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”62 Professor Brilmayer succinctly identifies the rationale
and requirement for general jurisdiction:
[O]nly a direct relationship between the forum and the
defendant justifies the imposition of the state’s coercive
power. That relationship does not rest upon the state’s right
to regulate the outside activities, but on its power over the
individual directly. The defendant’s local activities,
therefore, must be substantial enough to justify such power;
they cannot be sporadic or occasional, even though
sporadic activities themselves might be subject to local
regulation when they are the source of the dispute.63
These ideas require careful consideration in today’s complex global
economy. Justice Brennan admonishes us thusly:
By broadening the type and amount of business
opportunities available to participants in interstate and
foreign commerce, our economy has increased the
frequency with which foreign corporations actively pursue
commercial transactions throughout the various States. In
turn, it has become both necessary and, in my view,
desirable to allow the States more leeway in bringing the
activities of these nonresident corporations within the
scope of their respective jurisdictions.64
Echoing the fairness rationale mentioned above in the discussion on
general jurisdiction theory, he goes on to explain that as “active participants
in interstate and foreign commerce take advantage of the economic benefits
and opportunities offered by the various States, it is only fair and
60. Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 771.
61. Id.
62. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
63. Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 771.
64. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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reasonable to subject them to the obligations that may be imposed by those
jurisdictions.”65 The main obligation “that a nonresident corporation should
expect to fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly
affected by the corporation’s commercial activities.”66 This fairness
rationale continues to echo throughout the historical line of cases defining
personal jurisdiction following Pennoyer.
II. HISTORY OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court’s back-and-forth with general jurisdiction is
anything but helpful. Instead of a “coherent vision of the law of personal
jurisdiction . . . the Court’s fact-specific, case-by-case approach has
produced an ever-widening doctrinal morass.”67 The problem is that the
Court’s approach has seemingly lost sight of the bedrock of personal
jurisdiction: due process.68 This section traces the history of the Court’s
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. In doing so, this section’s goal is to
help the litigator determine how to satisfy general jurisdiction under the
Daimler standard and to help the judiciary craft a more coherent and
simplistic general jurisdiction standard that fits within the notions of
modern-day due process.
A. Pennoyer v. Neff
Where it all begins—Pennoyer v. Neff.69 In many ways, Pennoyer
is still the flagship case for personal jurisdiction, even if it is not the leading
case for personal jurisdiction analysis today.70 Most importantly, in
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court tied personal jurisdiction to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 The Court famously established
this principle:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may
be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State
resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice
65. Id. at 423.
66. Id.
67. Grossi, supra note 16, at 618.
68. Id. at 619. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
69. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
70. Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear & Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme
Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865, 869–70 (2013). Blanchard’s article provides a
succinct and helpful exposition of a history of personal jurisdiction.
71. Id. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
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to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties
over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute
due process of law. Whatever difficulty may be
experienced in giving to those terms a definition which will
embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting
private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can
be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial
proceedings.72
Later opinions of the Court use this due-process rationale to intuit
the substantive criteria of personal jurisdiction.73 The facts and holding of
Pennoyer are not nearly as important as its catalytic nature. The territorial
approach of the Pennoyer Court in 1877 was eventually replaced by the
contacts theory of personal jurisdiction laid down by Justice Stone in
International Shoe. But the link between personal jurisdiction and due
process is extremely important for the development of personal jurisdiction
as a whole, and more distinctly, the evolution of general jurisdiction.
B. International Shoe
When International Shoe came onto the scene of personal
jurisdiction, the entire field was redesigned. An entirely new doctrine of
personal jurisdiction emerged; what was once governed by territoriality is
now governed by minimum contacts and reasonableness.
International Shoe Company operated a nationwide business selling
shoes and other footwear.74 It was a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Missouri.75 It employed about a dozen salesmen that
peddled footwear in Washington.76 The issue before the lower courts, and
ultimately the Supreme Court, was whether Washington could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the corporation and thus subject it to state taxes.77
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Washington could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the parent company, International Shoe, in
Missouri.78
The Court laid down the still-current foundation of personal
jurisdiction:

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
Blanchard, supra note 70, at 870.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 322.
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Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in
personam is grounded on their de facto power over the
defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now
that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”79
This is the core holding of International Shoe that has survived
numerous iterations of personal jurisdiction rules.80
Notably, the Court’s discussion of corporations and personal
jurisdiction is of great import here.81 For instance, the Court claimed that
because “the corporate personality is a fiction,” personal jurisdiction over
corporations relies on the law of agency—“the state of its origin can be
manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are
authorized to act for it.”82 Much of the Court’s opinion on this matter laid
the groundwork for the doctrine of general jurisdiction.83 This dicta led to
the conclusion that when a corporation conducts activities in a state and
enjoys its attendant protections, obligations may arise, such as requiring the
corporation to answer a lawsuit in that state.84 From this language, the
79. Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
80. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (“The canonical opinion
in this area remains International Shoe . . . .”) (internal citations omitted); Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918-19 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
81. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
82. Id.
83. E.g., id. at 317 (“Presence in the state in this sense has never been doubted when
the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an
agent to accept service of process has been given.”); id. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances
in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and
of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.”); id. at 319 (“Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”).
84. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.

200

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3: 187

Court has crafted the doctrine of general jurisdiction over the last threequarters of a century. Unfortunately, the Court has not remained entirely
consistent with this original idea, crafted in the mid-twentieth century,
regarding the interplay of corporate structure and personal jurisdiction.
C. Perkins
It is here, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,85 that the
doctrine of general jurisdiction began to take shape (or at least the shape it
has more-or-less kept for the last 60 years). The defendant in this case, like
International Shoe, was a corporation.86 The company operated mining
properties in the Philippines, but during its occupation by the Japanese, the
president of the corporation returned home to Ohio, where he continued to
essentially direct the company.87 He cashed checks, held directors’
meetings, and supervised policies of the corporation.88 The Supreme Court
found that the defendant “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.”89
It ultimately held that the corporation was thus subject to personal
jurisdiction in Ohio.90
In reaching this decision, the Court first dealt with the agency
problem—only the president of the company was in Ohio.91 On this issue,
the Court held:
[I]f an authorized representative of a foreign corporation be
physically present in the state of the forum and be there
engaged in activities appropriate to accepting service or
receiving notice on its behalf [then] there is no unfairness
in subjecting that corporation to the jurisdiction of the
courts of that state through such service of process upon
that representative.92
Second, and more importantly, the Court clarified the doctrine of
general jurisdiction. For a corporation to be subjected to general jurisdiction
in a state in which it is not incorporated, the “amount and kind of activities
which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Id. at 438.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952).
Id.
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forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the
jurisdiction of the state are to be determined in each case.”93 Those kinds of
activities must be “continuous and systematic,” such as: (1) directors’
meetings, (2) business correspondence, (3) banking, (4) stock transfers,
(5) payment of salaries, and (6) purchasing of machinery.94 Not
surprisingly, all of these activities were the exact activities performed by
the president of Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.
Because the Court found that the corporation’s activities were
continuous and systematic, the corporation was subject to suit in Ohio for
acts that were unrelated to the suit’s underlying dispute.95 Unfortunately for
proponents of an expansive theory of general jurisdiction, this is the only
U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court has found the activities of a
corporation to be of such a continuous and systematic nature as to justify
the exercise of general jurisdiction.96
D. Helicopteros
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall was the
Supreme Court’s first significant general jurisdiction case after Perkins.97
With this case, the Court began the trend toward narrowing the scope of
general jurisdiction.98 Here, the defendant (Helicopteros, or Helicol) was a
Columbian corporation with its principal place of business in Columbia.99
The facts giving rise to the lawsuit involved a helicopter crash in Peru in
which the lives of four American citizens were claimed.100 Their survivors
and decedents brought suit and attempted to hale the defendant, Helicol,
into court in Texas.101
Here, Helicol’s contacts with Texas were not connected to the
subject of the suit, so the plaintiffs turned to general jurisdiction—which
the Court ultimately rejected.102 The Court first reiterated the holding of
Perkins, namely that “due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting
the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient

93. Id. at 445.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 448-49.
96. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
97. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 409.
100. Id. at 409–10.
101. Id. at 410.
102. Id. at 418.
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contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”103 The Court
summarized Helicol’s relevant contacts with Texas this way:
It is undisputed that Helicol does not have a place of
business in Texas and never has been licensed to do
business in the State. Basically, Helicol’s contacts with
Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to
Houston for a contract-negotiating session; accepting into
its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston
bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment and training
services from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums; and
sending personnel to Bell’s facilities in Fort Worth for
training.104
The Court concluded that the contacts here were less significant
than those in Perkins, so the plaintiffs could not rely on general jurisdiction
as their personal jurisdiction theory.105
The Court then took an interesting turn. It dismissed as
insignificant the contacts between the purchases of equipment and related
training trips.106 But it did so based on the holding of a pre-International
Shoe opinion, which found that purchases and related trips were not enough
“for a State’s assertion of jurisdiction.”107 Nonetheless, the Court imported
this holding from Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.: “[M]ere
purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a
State’s assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation
in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions.”108
Writing alone, Justice Brennan took a contrary position.109 He was
wary of the court’s citing of the Rosenberg Bros. case to establish the
constitutional boundaries of due process as evidenced in general
jurisdiction.110 Brennan would have held that the undisputed contacts in this
case were sufficient to satisfy general jurisdiction—“Helicol has
103. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
104. Id. at 416.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 417. Notably, the Texas Supreme Court found these contacts to be
dispositive of the general jurisdiction issue. Id.
107. Id. The Court looks to the case of Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.,
260 U.S. 516 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). Although the case may be important in the balance of the
Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, it is odd indeed to rely on such a short,
undetailed opinion from the Pennoyer era of personal jurisdiction. Cf. Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 419–20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418.
109. Id. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 420.

2016]

SALVAGING GENERAL JURISDICTION

203

purposefully availed itself of the benefits and obligations of the forum.”111
He then began to poke holes in the majority’s arguments.112
First, Justice Brennan explained he did not read Perkins to establish
the “necessary minimum” that a corporation’s contacts must reach before it
may be subject to general jurisdiction.113 Brennan reasoned that the “vast
expansion of our national economy during the past several decades has
provided the primary rationale for expanding the permissible reach of a
State’s jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”114 He went on to explain
his rationale:
[T]his trend toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporation and other
nonresidents is entirely consistent with the traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice that control our
inquiry under the Due Process Clause. As active
participants in interstate and foreign commerce take
advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities
offered by the various States, it is only fair and reasonable
to subject them to the obligations that may be imposed by
those jurisdictions. And chief among the obligations that a
nonresident corporation should expect to fulfill is
amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly
affected by the corporation’s commercial activities.115
Although this may seem incongruent with the concept of
“minimum contacts,” it is not incongruent with the doctrine of “fair play
and substantial justice.”116 The modern interpretation of specific jurisdiction
by the Court is rightly linked to the doctrine of minimum contacts.117 But
this is not so with general jurisdiction.118 International Shoe made clear that
when corporations take advantage of the benefits of a state, they might also
incur reciprocal obligations.119 Justice Brennan’s iteration of general
jurisdiction is entirely consistent with the Court’s holding in International
Shoe.120 If the ultimate question is fairness to the defendant, it makes little
111. Id.
112. Id. at 420–28.
113. Id. at 421.
114. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984).
115. Id. at 423.
116. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
117. See Grossi, supra note 16, at 622–24.
118. Id. at 623.
119. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318–20.
120. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419–427
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sense that the decision of whether to exercise general jurisdiction lies with
the Court on an ad hoc basis.121 Leaving foreign corporations at the mercy
of the Court’s fact-finding and balancing seems inconsistent with
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”122
Justice Brennan’s idea is much more understandable in light of the due
process heart of personal jurisdiction.123
E. Goodyear
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown arises from a
bus accident in France that claimed the lives of two 13-year-old boys from
North Carolina.124 The plaintiff–parents of the two boys filed suit in North
Carolina state court against Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation, as well as
three of Goodyear USA’s indirect subsidiaries in Luxembourg, Turkey, and
France, each of which disputed the North Carolina court’s personal
jurisdiction over them.125 Notably, these subsidiaries were “not registered to
do business in North Carolina.”126 Furthermore, they had “no place of
business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina.”127 Finally, even
though a small percentage of their tires were distributed with the state by
other Goodyear affiliates, the subsidiaries did “not design, manufacture, or
advertise their products in North Carolina . . . [and did] not solicit business
in North Carolina.”128
Led by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that those connections with
North Carolina were insufficient to warrant an exercise of general
jurisdiction by North Carolina state courts.129 Even under the form of
general jurisdiction this note proposes, these contacts are likely not within
the gambit of activities that would warrant a reasonable extension of
general jurisdiction. What is disconcerting about this opinion is not the
holding, but the rule that emerges.130 The Court here exclaims that
121. Id. at 427 (“Our interpretation of the Due Process Clause has never been so
dependent upon the applicable substantive law or the State’s formal pleading
requirements.”).
122. Id. (“[T]he principal focus when determining whether a forum may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant has been on fairness and
reasonableness to the defendant.”).
123. See id. at 419–27.
124. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011).
125. Id. at 919–21. Goodyear USA did not dispute the North Carolina court’s
jurisdiction over it. Id. at 919.
126. Id. at 921.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 930–31.
130. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011).
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jurisdiction “could be asserted where the corporation’s in-state activity is
‘continuous and systematic’ and that activity gave rise to the episode-insuit.”131 This is systematically concerning. It appears that Justice Ginsburg
here is mixing elements of specific jurisdiction with elements of personal
jurisdiction.
Purportedly, International Shoe stands for the proposition that the
activities of a defendant can be significant enough to satisfy general
jurisdiction even if the contacts are unrelated to the instant suit.132 In no
uncertain terms, the International Shoe Court explains: “there have been
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.”133 This distinction seems to escape the Court’s opinion in
Goodyear.
While the Court incorporates both Perkins and Helicopteros, it still
finds that the defendant’s contacts with North Carolina are not continuous
and substantial enough to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.134
Like in Helicopteros, the Court simply groups the factual scenarios from
prior general jurisdiction cases together and measures the contacts in the
present case against them.135
In finding that the defendant’s contacts did not satisfy general
jurisdiction, the Court, rather slyly, states a new rule for general jurisdiction
that will carry over into Daimler.136 Citing International Shoe, von Mehren,
Trautman, and Brilmayer, the Court provides the current jurisdictional rule:
A court may assert general jurisdiction (sister-state or
foreign-country) over corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State
are so “continuous and systematic” as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State. Specific jurisdiction,
on the other hand, depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the
forum and the underlying controversy,” principally, activity

131. Id. (emphasis in original).
132. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
133. Id. (emphasis added). While Justice Ginsburg quotes a relevant section of
International Shoe in saying that “continuous activity of some sorts” will not be enough to
require those defendants to be amenable to suit in that State, Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 at 927
(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318), she arguably still moves general jurisdiction to a much
less significant place than the International Shoe court intended.
134. Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 at 930.
135. Id. at 929 (“Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is not a
forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.”).
136. Id. at 919–20.
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or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is
therefore subject to the State’s regulation.137
Although this standard is the current rule that plaintiffs must
satisfy, the phrase “essentially at home in the forum state” is not found in
any prior general jurisdiction cases.138 For better or worse, plaintiffs must
now plead enough jurisdictional facts to satisfy the Court’s current
understanding of being “essentially at home.”
III. DAIMLER
On January 14, 2014, the Supreme Court decided its fourth general
jurisdiction case, adding to the limited body of case law governing an
important doctrine.139 Several citizens of Argentina sued Daimler AG in a
California federal court looking to recover under the Alien Tort Statute.140
The plaintiffs claimed that Daimler, through its Argentinian subsidiary,
“collaborated with the Argentinian government to detain, torture, and kill
some of the subsidiary’s employees.”141 Although quite complicated, at
heart, the plaintiffs alleged that jurisdiction was proper due to the California
contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), another Daimler
subsidiary.142 Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and, in
another opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, further narrowed the scope
of general jurisdiction.143 The following four sections explore the most
pertinent portions of this case’s procedural history: (A) the original
proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California;
(B) the appeal and subsequent en banc review in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit; (C) the authoritative opinion of the U.S. Supreme
Court; and (D) the compelling concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor.

137. Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
138. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 ;
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
139. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746. See Cam Barker et al., U.S. Supreme Ct. Update, 26 APP.
ADVOC. 436, 443–45 (2014); Elizabeth M. Weldon & Marjorie A. Witter, Keeping Current,
2014-MAY BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2014).
140. Barker, supra note 139, at 443.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 444.
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A. Northern District of California
In Bauman v. Daimlerchrysler AG, one Chilean citizen and
22 Argentinian citizens filed suit against a host of corporations, both
foreign and domestic, alleging that Mercedes-Benz Argentina collaborated
with the Argentinian government to kidnap and torture the plaintiffs and the
plaintiffs’ relatives during the Dirty War of 1976–1983.144 The multiple
corporate defendants (and their attendant corporate structures) are very
confusing, but necessary to understand because agency is important for
establishing general jurisdiction over corporate defendants. At root, the
plaintiffs alleged that because DaimlerChrysler Argentina (DCA; and
formerly known as Mercedes-Benz Argentina) is “either a division or
wholly owned subsidiary of” DaimlerChrisler AG (DCAG), then DCAG is
subject to the personal jurisdiction of California via agency.145 DCAG
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.146 The district court
tentatively granted the motion,147 and then later solidified the order and
dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over DCAG.148
The district court then delved into an extremely detailed analysis of
the defendants’ personal jurisdiction argument.149 It laid out a two-part test
adapted from Helicopteros: “(1) whether defendant has systematic and
continuous contacts with California; and (2) whether the assertion of
general jurisdiction is reasonable.”150 Before proceeding, the court
recognized the difficulty of its inquiry:
This case presents a difficult question: can a federal court
exercise personal jurisdiction over a case arising under
federal subject matter jurisdiction in which plaintiffs are all
foreign nationals and the defendant is a foreign corporation
which has subsidiaries doing business in the United
States?151
Under then-current Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, the plaintiff had to
establish that the defendant had been “conducting business in California,

144. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31929, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) (Order Tentatively Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss).
145. Id. at *3–4.
146. Id. at *1–3.
147. Id. at *61.
148. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2007 WL 486389,
at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss).
149. Bauman, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31929, at *10–61.
150. Id. at *10.
151. Id. at *11.
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not merely with California.”152 The district court then lays out its
framework for determining “systematic and continuous contacts”:
First, [courts] seek to determine whether there is “some
kind of deliberate physical presence” in the forum state,
including physical facilities, bank accounts, agents,
registration, or incorporation. . . . Second, courts “look at
whether the company has engaged in active solicitation
toward and participation in the state’s markets, i.e., the
economic reality of the defendant’s activities in the
state.”153
The court analyzed the nine different contacts that the plaintiffs
alleged the defendant had with the state of California.154 It concluded that
five of these nine contacts were not attributable to DCAG but rather to its
subsidiaries.155 Thus, these contacts were “not properly considered direct
contacts of DCAG to California.”156 The remaining four contacts were
found to be “direct” contacts with California, but they were not enough to
satisfy this first prong of general jurisdiction—systematic and continuous
contacts.157
The plaintiffs also alleged that DCAG had sufficient contacts with
California due to the agency relationship between itself and its subsidiaries,
specifically MBUSA.158 It alleged the following contacts: (1) “MBUSA has
its principal place of business in New Jersey and is wholly-owned by
DaimlerChrysler North America Holding Company, a Delaware
corporation[,]” (2) MBUSA serves the U.S. as DCAG’s “exclusive
Mercedes-Benz importer and sales agent,” (3) “MBUSA is the single
largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California car market,” and
(4) MBUSA maintains an office and Vehicle Preparation Center in
California.159 The plaintiffs posited that these contacts created an agency
relationship that could impute the subsidiary’s contacts to the parent
company.160

152. Id.
153. Id. at *13.
154. Id. at *17–31.
155. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31929, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).
156. Id.
157. Id. at *30–31.
158. Id. at *31.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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In the Ninth Circuit, a court may impute a subsidiary’s contacts to
its parent when the “subsidiary is the parent’s alter ego or where the
subsidiary acts as the general agent of the parent.”161 These tests are
different and either may be used to impute a subsidiary’s contacts to a
parent for purposes of personal jurisdiction.
To establish that the subsidiary is the alter ego of the parent
corporation, the plaintiffs must make out a prima facie case
(1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer
exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate
identities] would result in fraud or injustice.162
The agency test is related, but not identical.
To satisfy the agency test, plaintiffs must make a prima
facie showing that the subsidiary represents the parent
corporation by performing services sufficiently important
to the [parent] corporation that if it did not have a
representative to perform them, the [parent] corporation
would undertake to perform similar services. The agency
test permits the imputation of contacts where the subsidiary
was either established for, or is engaged in, activities that,
but for the existence of the subsidiary, the parent would
have to undertake.163
It seems that the plaintiffs’ evidence would clearly meet either of
these tests, thus allowing the five MBUSA contacts to be imputed to
DCAG. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs did not argue the alter ego test.164 But
regarding the agency test, the district court found that, on balance, the
plaintiffs provided no evidence that DCAG exercised operational control
over MBUSA.165

161. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31929, at *31 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) (emphasis added).
162. Id. at *33.
163. Id. at *34 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court also identified
several factors that may be considered in making a determination as to whether a
subsidiary’s contacts satisfy the agency test: “(1) what percentage of the parent corporation’s
business comes from the subsidiary; (2) whether the parent corporation’s only agent in the
United States is the subsidiary; and (3) whether the parent corporation conducts marketing
activities in the United States.” Id. at *34.
164. Id. at *33.
165. Id. at *36.
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The district court then proceeded to conduct an excruciatingly
detailed analysis of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
reasonable.166 It is unclear why the court did this, because it had already
found the first prong of the general jurisdiction test was not met.167
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this
case would violate the defendant’s due process rights.168
B. Ninth Circuit
1. Three-Judge Panel Decision
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court,169 over the
strong dissent of Judge Reinhardt,170 who eventually wrote the en banc
decision reversing the three-judge panel.171 The Ninth Circuit began its
analysis by noting what was implicit in the district court’s opinion: that the
“existence of a relationship between a parent company and its subsidiaries”
is not enough.172 What the Ninth Circuit went on to parse, however, is the
distinction between a parent–subsidiary relationship and a holding
company–subsidiary relationship.173 The court concluded that subsidiaries
do not conduct business as agents when the “business of the parent is the
business of investment.”174 It then defined the facts needed to prove the
existence of a requisite agency relationship: “monitoring of the subsidiary’s
performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s finance and capital budget
decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures.”175 The Ninth
Circuit also clarified the agency test in that circuit:
First, the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and
continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or
instrumentality of the parent, notwithstanding the
maintenance of corporate formalities. Control must be over
166. Id. at *38–61.
167. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31929, at *29–31 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).
168. See Bauman, 2007 WL 486389, at *6–7 (holding that jurisdictional discovery did
not produce any significant evidence to change the court’s mind on declining to extend
personal jurisdiction).
169. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009).
170. Id. at 1098–1106 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
171. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., for the majority).
172. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1094.
173. Id. at 1095.
174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id.
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and above that to be expected as an incident of ownership.
Second, the agent-subsidiary must also be sufficiently
important to the parent corporation that if it did not have a
representative, the parent corporation would undertake to
perform substantially similar services.176
Ultimately, the court concluded that the jurisdictional facts did not
establish “pervasive and continual control.”177 Although the court found
that the question was close, there was no “prima facie showing that DCAG
would undertake to perform substantially similar services in the absence of
MBUSA.”178
In his dissent, Judge Reinhardt formulated the argument that would
eventually prevail at the en banc level.179 Specifically, he argued that the
new test required a “much stronger relationship between parent and
subsidiary than is necessary or desirable,” and that the result would be “to
shield foreign corporations from actions in American courts—although they
have structured their affairs so as to reap vast profits from American
markets—and to deprive plaintiffs, including those who allege grave human
rights abuses, of access to justice.”180
Judge Reinhardt then chipped away at the majority’s exceedingly
stringent test. After quoting the same rule as the majority,181 he found that
the “principal focus of the agency test for purposes of general
jurisdiction . . . is not ‘control’—much less ‘pervasive and continual’
control—but rather the relative importance of the services provided to the
parent corporation.”182 In Reinhardt’s view, the majority essentially
conflated the two tests which now, in practice, requires plaintiffs to meet
the more stringent alter ego test.183
The important takeaway from Judge Reinhardt’s dissent is that the
court was “establishing a test for agency in a specialized context.”184 As he
explained:
176. Id. at 1095.
177. Id. at 1096.
178. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). Also,
unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit did not get to the issue of reasonableness because
there were not continuous and systematic contacts. Id. at 1097.
179. Id. at 1098–1106 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1098.
181. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001).
182. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1098 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Notably, the actual text of the agency test requires a “showing that the subsidiary
functions as the parent corporation’s representative in that it performs services that are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation . . . .” Id. (quoting Unocal, 248 F.3d at 928).
183. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1099.
184. Id. at 1100.

212

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3: 187

We are deciding one question only: whether DCAG has
sufficient minimum contacts with [the forum state] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed, our tests
for agency and alter ego when the issue is jurisdictional are
merely shorthand devices for defining what constitutes
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for
purposes of the due process analysis of International Shoe
based upon the parent-subsidiary relationship.185
Here, Judge Reinhardt is absolutely correct. Personal jurisdiction,
as a threshold issue, should not require the specificity of vicarious liability
or a “scope of employment” determination. The purpose of general
jurisdiction is to get the defendant (usually a corporate one) into the
courtroom. If the issue were one of, say, whether to pierce the corporate
veil, then the majority’s test may well be appropriate. But in a situation like
this, such a stringent test defeats the purposes of general jurisdiction.186
What is exceedingly frustrating about this case is that both parties
agreed that “MBUSA’s contacts with California warrant the exercise of
general jurisdiction.”187 The only hiccup in haling DCAG into court is the
majority’s overly exacting agency test for general jurisdiction. Judge
Reinhardt quoted Judge Weinstein, and the quotation is apt:
To any layman it would seem absurd that our courts could
not obtain jurisdiction over a billion dollar multinational
which is exploiting the critical New York and American
markets to keep its home production going at a huge
volume and profit. This perception must have a bearing on
our evaluation of fairness. The law ignores the common
sense of a situation at the peril of becoming irrelevant as an
institution.188
Reinhardt concluded by pointing to the obvious: it would seem
strange to an ordinary California citizen, who sees Mercedes-Benz vehicles

185. Id. at 1100 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. It is worth noting here that Judge Reinhardt listed (with much more detail than the
majority) a host of ways in which DCAG exerts control over MBUSA. See id. at 1101. In his
view, such control satisfies even the majority’s more stringent analysis. Id.
187. Id. at 1102.
188. Id. at 1103 (quoting Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp.
1322, 1327 (Weinstein, C.J.)).
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constantly on the street, that the ultimate financial owner of Mercedes-Benz
cannot be haled into court in California.189
2. Panel Rehearing
The panel rehearing was the best news that the plaintiffs had during
the entirety of this litigation. It may have been their only favorable ruling.
At the outset, Judge Reinhardt set the tone of the opinion by bringing up the
point that the district court “did not hold an evidentiary hearing when it
ruled on DCAG’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.”190
Citing Doe v. Unocal Corp., he clarified that “the plaintiffs ‘need only
demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the
defendant.’”191
Although it is apparent which side Judge Reinhardt was on in
writing this opinion, frankly, it is a nice change of pace. Writing for the
Ninth Circuit Panel, Judge Reinhardt first discussed the vast amount of
revenue that DCAG received through its subsidiaries in the United States,
especially its sales of Mercedes-Benz automobiles.192 Next, the court, in
some detail, delved into the General Distributor Agreement between DCAG
and MBUSA that, in the words of the court, “establishe[d] extensive
requirements for MBUSA as the general distributor.”193
Although repetition of the court’s findings is not needed here, an
overview of the components of the agreement bears mentioning. For
example, DCAG exercised some level of control over the following aspects
of its subsidiaries: sales objectives and network, dealership standards,
business systems (accounting, inventory, etc.), collection of customer
information, management personnel requirements, vehicle service
standards, warranty terms, technical service publications, advertising
standards, signage, prices, change in corporate formation, working capital,
customer satisfaction policies, trademark ownership, and ability to contract
with third parties.194 These facts ended up being dispositive for the court
upon reconsideration.
Since a court of appeals may review a lack of personal jurisdiction
under the de novo standard, it may re-weigh the facts, testimony, record,
and legal standards without deference to the district court’s findings or legal

189. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1103. Judge Reinhardt continued by finding that exercising
personal jurisdiction in this case comports with the reasonableness factors. Id. at 1103–06.
190. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2011) (rehearing).
191. Id. (citing Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).
192. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 913–14.
193. Id. at 914.
194. Id. at 914–17.
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conclusions.195 After considering the facts, the court, on appeal, comes out
the other way from the district court. It is important to note here that the
plaintiffs’ facts must be taken as true because the district court did not hold
an evidentiary hearing.196
First, the court concluded that MBUSA has requisite contacts with
California.197 In fact, both parties agreed that California courts might
lawfully exercise general jurisdiction over MBUSA.198 Therefore, the court
appropriately framed the question as “whether MBUSA’s extensive
contacts with California warrant[ed] the exercise of general jurisdiction
over DCAG.”199
Second, just like the Ninth Circuit in its revoked opinion, and the
district court before that, the two parent–subsidiary tests were in the
limelight. What Judge Reinhardt made clear is that the alter ego test is
conclusively about control, whereas the agency test is about the importance
of the subsidiary’s services to the parent company.200 In this light, Judge
Reinhardt framed the question thusly:
For the agency test, we ask: Are the services provided by
MBUSA sufficiently important to DCAG that, if MBUSA
went out of business, DCAG would continue selling cars in
this vast market either by selling them itself, or
alternatively by selling them through a new representative?
We answer this question in the affirmative.201
This test essentially asks whether the subsidiary is performing a
service that the parent would perform itself in the subsidiary’s absence. As
interesting as this sounds, such a question gets to the heart of this general
jurisdiction battle and the frustration of Judge Reinhardt (and later
Justice Sotomayor). The vast and intricate legal structure of a corporation,
which is a legal fiction, should not make it impossible for that company to
be haled into court simply because it sends an agent to do its work. The
deep pocket (here, DCAG) truly lies at the top of this parent-subsidiary
structure. If a wronged plaintiff cannot reach the legal person who allegedly
financed and oversaw the company that tortured and killed the plaintiffs

195. See id. at 919 (discussing the standard of review) (citing Butcher’s Union Local
No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986)).
196. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 913.
197. Id. at 920.
198. Id. at 920 n.11.
199. Id. at 920.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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and their decedents, then there must be a serious gap in the legal system.
Judge Reinhardt identified such a gap here.
The court found that “MBUSA’s services were sufficiently
important to DCAG and . . . DCAG had the right to substantially control
MBUSA’s activities,” and therefore, MBUSA was DCAG’s agent.202 After
this finding, the burden was on the defendant to show that an exercise of
personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable.203 Weighing the
reasonableness factors, the court determined that DCAG had not carried
this burden.204 In summary, the court stated: “[W]e conclude that it is
reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over DCAG in California, a state that has
itself become a major hub for world commerce and attracts business not
only from all over Europe, but from all over Asia as well.”205
C. Supreme Court
As often happens, everything changes at the Supreme Court. The
careful distinctions between the agency and alter ego theories are of no
moment because the Court, per Justice Ginsburg, held that general
jurisdiction covers an extremely narrow set of circumstances, and this is not
one.206 What is remarkable about this holding is that the Court assumes that
all nine of the contacts outlined in the district court’s opinion qualify as
such for personal jurisdiction purposes, and yet, these contacts are still
insufficient for general jurisdiction.207
202. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (rehearing).
203. Id.
204. Id. The seven factors considered are:
[T]he extent of purposeful interjection; the burden on the defendant; the
extent of conflict with sovereignty of the defendant’s state; the forum
sate’s interest in adjudicating the suit; the most efficient judicial
resolution of the dispute; the convenience and effectiveness of relief for
the plaintiff; and the existence of an alternative forum.
Id. at 925.
205. Id. at 930. In concluding, the court cited Burger King v. Rudcewiecz for the
proposition that “the Supreme Court ‘long ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction
might turn on “mechanical” tests’ that failed to take account of reality.” Id. (quoting Burger
King v. Rudcewiecz, 471 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1985)).
206. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“Even if we were to assume
that MBUSA is at home in California, and further to assume that MBUSA’s contacts are
imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction
in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.”).
207. Such a conclusion is ironic because this is a much different ground than the one
relied on by the district court or the Ninth Circuit in its first opinion. The district court
granted the motion to dismiss because it found that only three of the nine contacts were
imputable to DCAG, and that they were not enough for personal jurisdiction. Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit, in its first opinion, found that the motion to dismiss was proper because all
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The Court first thoroughly recited the facts208 and procedural
history and efficiently outlined the histories of personal jurisdiction210
and general jurisdiction.211 Justice Ginsburg then recognized that Professors
von Mehren and Trautman were correct in their prediction: Specific
jurisdiction has played a central role in determining personal jurisdiction
and general jurisdiction has taken a back seat.212 The Court then
summarized its general jurisdiction jurisprudence:
209

International Shoe distinguished between, on the one hand,
exercises of specific jurisdiction, as just described, and on
the other, situations where a foreign corporation’s
continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it
on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities. As we have since explained, [a] court
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims
against them when their affiliations with the State are so
continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at
home in the forum state.213
Because the Court found that “general jurisdiction has come to
occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary scheme,” it declined to
stretch general jurisdiction beyond its traditionally recognized limits.214
Thus, the culmination of Pennoyer, International Shoe, Perkins,
Helicopteros, Goodyear, and Daimler resulted in this rule: For a defendant
to be subject to a court’s general jurisdiction, he must be “essentially at
home in the forum state.” This is a far cry from the principles of Perkins,
where “continuous corporate operations within a state” justified suit against
the corporation “on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct

nine contacts could not be attributed to DCAG. Here, the Court looks past that, imputes all
nine contacts to DCAG, and still finds insufficient connection to California.
208. Id. at 751–52.
209. Id. at 752–53.
210. Id. at 753–54.
211. Id. at 754–58 (discussing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); and Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
212. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755–56.
213. Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915
at 919; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n.9).
214. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757–58.
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from those activities.”215 A corporation can only have a few true homes: its
place of incorporation and its principle place of business. It does not appear
that the Court would find general jurisdiction even on the facts of Perkins
in today’s jurisdictional world.
The Court next turned to the Ninth Circuit’s agency theory for
imputing contacts from MBUSA to DCAG.216 It gave the theory little
consideration, however, reasoning:
Even if [it] were to assume MBUSA is at home in
California, and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are
imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to
subject [DCAG] to general jurisdiction in California, for
[DCAG’s] slim contacts with the State hardly render it at
home there.217
The Court declined to look beyond the forum where a corporation
is “incorporated or has its principal place of business” to a “State in which a
corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of
business.’”218 The Court found that formulation “unacceptably grasping.”219
This is a little bit shocking. Although Justice Ginsburg recognized the
general jurisdiction avenue laid down in International Shoe,220 the Court
circled back to the idea of being “essentially at home in the forum state.”221
When the Court found that DCAG was not at home in California through its
agent of MBUSA, it reversed the Ninth Circuit and found the case wanting
of personal jurisdiction.222

215. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446.
216. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759.
217. Id. at 760.
218. Id. at 760–61.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 761 (“Turning to all-purpose jurisdiction, in contrast, International Shoe
speaks of ‘instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so
substantial and of such a nature to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
318 (1945)) (italics in original).
221. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 at 919). Interestingly,
here, Justice Ginsburg relies on an article by Professor Twitchell for the proposition that
general jurisdiction does not simply exist “wherever continuous and systematic contacts are
found.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (citing Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business
with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 184 (2001)).
222. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
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D. Sotomayor Concurrence
Justice Sotomayor alone disagreed with the Court’s analysis of
personal jurisdiction.223 She recognized the core of the majority’s problem:
“In recent years, Americans have grown accustomed to the concept of
multinational corporations that are supposedly ‘too big to fail’; today the
Court deems Daimler ‘too big for general jurisdiction.’”224
Justice Sotomayor eloquently expressed her concern as follows:
As to substance, the Court’s focus on Daimler’s operations
outside of California ignores the lodestar of our personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence: A State may subject a defendant
to the burden of suit if the defendant has sufficiently taken
advantage of the State’s laws and protections through its
contacts in the State; whether the defendant has contacts
elsewhere is immaterial.225
She then began her analysis and critique of the majority
opinion. First, although the lower courts use a reasonableness prong when
analyzing general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has never required such
analysis, and it does not do so in this opinion.226 But, since Bauman never
argued against the use of the reasonableness prong, it should be considered
in this case and left open to decide in future cases.227 Because Bauman
failed to show that it was more reasonably convenient to litigate in
California, Justice Sotomayor ultimately agreed with the majority’s
outcome.228 However, since the parties were not asked to brief or orally
argue whether it was reasonable to litigate in California, Justice Sotomayor
criticized the Court’s fact-intensive analysis on that issue.229
Second, Justice Sotomayor raised the argument that the facts in this
case were almost analogous to Perkins.230 She argued that if full briefing
had been done on the issue the Court actually decided, all of the contacts
attributed to DCAG by way of MBUSA would be enough to satisfy general
jurisdiction.231
223. Id. at 763–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Despite disagreeing with the Court’s
analysis of personal jurisdiction, Justice Sotomayor did agree with the Court’s ultimate
result. Id.
224. Id. at 763.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 764–65.
227. Id. at 765.
228. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014).
229. Id. at 766.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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Third, Justice Sotomayor returned to the earlier-articulated tension
between Professors Brilmayer and Twitchell.232 She recognized that when a
“corporation chooses to invoke the benefits and protections of a State in
which it operates, the State acquires the authority to subject the company to
suit in its courts.”233 This conclusion touches on the reasonableness of a
broader general jurisdiction rule: that “there is nothing unpredictable about
a rule that instructs multinational corporations that if they engage in
continuous and substantial contacts with more than one State, they will be
subject to general jurisdiction in each one.”234 Just because the
International Shoe world did not have many corporations the size of
Daimler does not mean that the rule laid down in that case is inapplicable
now.235
Finally, Justice Sotomayor recognized the “deep injustice” that the
Daimler rule would produce.236 She gave four reasons why the modern
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence produces unfair results. First, it
disallows states’ adjudication of corporations that have continuous and
substantial business operations within their borders.237 Second, under this
new rule, large corporations will escape personal jurisdiction, while smaller
businesses will find themselves in court for the same lawsuits.238 Third,
because transient jurisdiction still exists, the lone traveler in a state can be
subjected to the jurisdiction of its courts, but a multinational corporation
cannot.239 Fourth, the effect of keeping large corporations out of a state’s
courts denies harmed individuals the just compensation they deserve.240 In
summary, Justice Sotomayor pointed out many of the problems with the
majority’s analysis and provided some guidance on crafting a better general
jurisdiction rule.
IV. SATISFYING THE DAIMLER TEST
Like it or not, the Daimler rule is the current test. Therefore,
plaintiffs need to know how to satisfy the current requirements of general
jurisdiction. In order to help plaintiffs meet these requirements, this section
covers a few topics. First, it explains what this new test actually means.
232. Id. at 768.
233. Id. Justice Sotomayor then references Professor Brilmayer for the proposition that
the focus should solely be on the corporation’s interactions with the forum state. Id. (citing
Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 742).
234. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770 (2014).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 772.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 773.
240. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014).
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Second, it discusses some novel methods of satisfying general jurisdiction,
specifically focusing on lower court decisions and the use of internet
contacts. Third, it provides a plaintiff’s checklist, which may prove helpful
for plaintiffs attempting to use general jurisdiction to hale corporate
defendants into court.
A. What the Test Actually Means
The good news for plaintiffs is that general jurisdiction still
exists.241 The bad news for plaintiffs is that it has been essentially limited to
the factual scenario of Perkins.242 Or, it has at least been limited to those
situations in which the contacts in a forum state are equal to or exceed those
in Perkins.243 According to the Court, the corporate defendant must be
“essentially at home in the forum state.”244
However, there is some good news for plaintiffs. Specifically, the
Court did not reject the agency theory of imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to
a parent corporation.245 This means that a plaintiff can use the contacts of a
subsidiary to help pull a parent defendant into the forum state.246
Accordingly, one will need to utilize either the agency or alter ego theory
set forth in the Ninth Circuit opinion.
Here is a suggestion for satisfying the current test. First, find as
much money changing hands within a state as possible. Then find a way to
impute those transactions to a parent corporation. Finally, list as many
potential ways the parent company has taken advantage of the privileges of
doing business in the forum state. Here you can also rely on the contacts of
the subsidiary if they may be properly imputed to the parent corporation.247
B. Wiggle Room in the Circuit/District Courts
The next places to look for help in haling a corporate defendant into
court under a general jurisdiction theory are (1) malleability in the standard
241. Although the Supreme Court has significantly narrowed the scope of general
jurisdiction, it is still a valid jurisdictional theory. See id. at 754–55.
242. Id. at 755–56.
243. Id.
244. For an analysis of a specific corporation’s contacts under the new Daimler
standard, see Tanya J. Monestier, Where is Home Depot “At Home”?: Daimler v. Bauman
& the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 233 (2014).
245. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758–62.
246. Id.
247. Look to Professor Brilmayer here for a much broader survey of case law
surrounding the imputation of a subsidiary’s contacts to a parent corporation. See Lea
Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction & Substantive Legal Relations: Corps.,
Conspiracies, & Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1986).
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found by lower courts and (2) the use of internet contacts. Although the use
of internet contacts is slightly more controversial, the use of such contacts
is increasingly dominating the personal jurisdiction analysis in an internetsaturated world.
1. Interpretations of Daimler’s Requirements
Ten federal circuits have considered Daimler’s new requirements at
length and, for the most part, have not strayed too far from the Court’s
directives.248 Perhaps the most restrictive is the Second Circuit. It has said
that aside from an exceptional case, “a corporation is at home . . . only in a
state that is the company’s formal place of incorporation or its principal
place of business.”249
The Fifth Circuit has also considered general jurisdiction in a postDaimler world. Although it did not call general jurisdiction an exceptional
case, it recognized that it is “incredibly difficult to establish general
jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal
place of business.”250 The difference between the Second and Fifth Circuits
may lie in the fact that the sheer number of corporate defendants that the
Second Circuit encounters makes it less amenable to general jurisdiction
from a pure efficiency rationale. Therefore, a plaintiff’s chances are better
in the Fifth Circuit than in the Second Circuit.
Perhaps because it was reversed in Daimler, the Ninth Circuit has
also refused to extend general jurisdiction beyond the facts of Perkins.251 It
has used the “exceptional case” language from Daimler to find that a
corporation did not have the requisite contacts in California to support
general jurisdiction.252 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit overlooked
Justice Sotomayor’s concerns in her concurrence and found that the
defendant corporation’s contacts in California must be compared with its

248. E.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2014);
Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Aero
Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014).
249. Gucci, 768 F.3d at 134–35 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761). Other notable
post-Daimler general jurisdiction cases are: Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S.,
750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc.,
745 F.3d 30, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2014).
250. Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). See also In
re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2014).
251. E.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014).
252. Id.
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worldwide contacts.253 Thus, a plaintiff’s chances for successfully arguing
general jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit are not good.
The most wiggle room may be found in the federal district courts.
In Barriere v. Juluca, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida provided some insight into how a plaintiff may properly use the
theory of general jurisdiction in a post-Daimler world.254 The court
characterized the Daimler rule as follows:
What is clear from Daimler is that, for a court to exercise
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, that
corporation must be “at home” in the forum. “At home”
can be read to mean “instances in which the continuous
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and
of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.” While the Court did not expand on the specifics,
it noted that it would be possible for a corporation to be “at
home” in places outside of its place of incorporation or
principal place of business.255
The court first noted that the defendant would have been subject to
personal jurisdiction before the Daimler decision.256 Then, it found that,
although Daimler “limited the application of general jurisdiction,” it did not
eliminate its application altogether.257 Ultimately, the court determined that
Daimler did not limit the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign
corporate defendant.258 However, it should be noted that other district
courts have come out the other way in similar factual circumstances.259

253. Id. (“General jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in
their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can
scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20)).
254. Barriere v. Juluca, No. 12–23510–CIV, 2014 WL 652831, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19,
2014).
255. Id. at *7.
256. Id. at *8.
257. Id. at *9.
258. Id. It should be noted that there are two factual differences between this case and
Daimler. First, Florida has an extensive history of using general jurisdiction to hale parent
corporations into court when their resort subsidiaries are responsible for injuries to patrons.
Id. Second, unlike Daimler, the subsidiary was a co-defendant in the action, along with the
parent company. Id. The way around Daimler could be found in haling both the parent and
the subsidiary into court for trial.
259. E.g., George v. Uponor Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063 (D. Minn. 2013).
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2. Internet Contacts
“The increasing use of the internet for the transaction of business,
especially involving the marketing and sale of goods and services, has
raised important issues regarding the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
foreign companies.”260 This section argues that the use of internet contacts
can help satisfy general jurisdiction in a post-Daimler world.
First, the use of internet contacts for purposes of general
jurisdiction is not a new idea.261 Most law students in the last decade have
encountered the so-called Zippo test for internet contacts.262 This test
separates internet websites into three categories: (1) interactive websites,
(2) passive websites, and (3) quasi-interactive websites.263 Contacts from an
interactive website will often qualify for specific jurisdiction purposes.264
On the other hand, contacts from a passive website will never qualify for
specific jurisdiction purposes.265 Finally, contacts from a quasi-interactive
website can sometimes qualify for specific jurisdiction purposes.266 Courts
in almost every federal circuit have either used or cited the Zippo test in a
positive manner.267 However, circuits are split on whether Zippo should
apply in the general jurisdiction context.268
The most helpful case in this arena is undoubtedly Gator.com Corp.
v. L.L. Bean, Inc., from the Ninth Circuit.269 Although later dismissed as
moot, the analysis from the Ninth Circuit has provided extremely helpful
guidance in using internet contacts in the general jurisdiction context.270
The court found that although there were fewer physical contacts than were
normally required under general jurisdiction principles, the defendant’s
“extensive marketing and sales in California, its extensive contacts with
California vendors, and the fact that, as alleged by [the plaintiff], its website
is clearly and deliberately structured to operate as a sophisticated virtual
260. Thomas A. Dickerson et al., Personal Jurisdiction & the Marketing of Goods &
Servs. on the Internet, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 32 (2012).
261. Kristin Woeste, General Jurisdiction & the Internet: Sliding Too Far?, 73 U. CIN.
L. REV. 793, 799 (2004).
262. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Woeste, supra note 261, at 796 n.17.
268. Id. at 799 n.36 (citing Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir.
2003).
269. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and
rehearing granted en banc by 366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004), dismissed as moot by 398 F.3d
1125 (9th Cir. 2005).
270. Id.
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store in California,” were sufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction
there.271
Although other circuits have rejected the Zippo test for general
jurisdiction,272 some courts have adopted a compromise.273 A number of
commentators have said that Zippo contacts could not satisfy general
jurisdiction when the physical contacts are lacking.274 But it does not appear
that the Supreme Court has created two categories of contacts, one for
general, and the other for specific jurisdiction. Instead, it has required the
following: If the defendant’s contacts are related to the underlying
controversy, few contacts are needed; if the defendant’s contacts are
unrelated to the underlying controversy, many contacts are needed.
Whether or not those contacts were established via the internet is of no
moment.
Although it is a new area of jurisdiction jurisprudence, internet
contacts could provide the way forward for the stringent general jurisdiction
framework established in Daimler.275 One scholar sums up this new horizon
of internet contacts for general jurisdiction like this:
The test for general jurisdiction needs to be refined such
that businesses can plan their Internet activities to reflect
the geographical extent to which they wish to be subject to
the jurisdiction of foreign fora. With additional clarity to
the jurisdictional analysis, businesses can refine their ecommerce policies to comport with the comfort level.276
Not only do internet contacts make the general jurisdiction
requirement easier to satisfy, but a clearer rule from the Supreme Court
could provide both plaintiffs and corporate defendants with the appropriate
notice as to the requisite standard.

271. Woeste, supra note 261, at 801–02 (quoting Gator.com Corp., 341 F.3d at 1078).
272. E.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002).
273. Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2003).
274. See Woeste, supra note 261, at 809.
275. For a vibrant discussion of this topic, see the following secondary sources: Charles
W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction Over the World-Wide Web, 52 THE
ADVOC. (TEXAS) 53 (2010); Eric C. Hawkins, General Jurisdiction & Internet Contacts:
What Role, If Any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2371 (2006); Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: the
Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147
(2005). See also Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154
(W.D. Wis. 2004) (discussing the use of internet contacts in general jurisdiction).
276. See Woeste, supra note 261, at 815.
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C. General Jurisdiction Plaintiff’s Checklist
This section provides a no-nonsense checklist for a plaintiff
attempting to satisfy the new rigorous standard of general jurisdiction in
Daimler. When filing suit in a particular state against a foreign corporate
defendant, use these guidelines to help in your pleading.
(1)
Is the defendant incorporated in the state of litigation? If
so, general jurisdiction is absolutely allowed.
(2)
Is the defendant’s principal place of business in the state of
litigation? If so, general jurisdiction is absolutely allowed.277
(3)
Does the defendant have an office, bank account,
employees, government contracts, an agent for service of process, corporate
meetings, a mailing address, a history of business deals, or other financial
connection with the state of litigation? If so, attach evidence of these
contacts (and as many as possible) to the initial pleading or to the response
brief (in the case of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
(4)
Does the defendant have a website? If so, look to the Zippo
test to determine whether the website contacts are sufficient for personal
jurisdiction purposes.
(5)
Are you lacking access to any of this information? If the
defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, ask for
a hefty amount of jurisdictional discovery. This should help unearth the
needed evidence to satisfy general jurisdiction.
(6)
Remember that, although general jurisdiction is now
limited, it is not impossible to satisfy. All that is required is evidence of
continuous and systematic contacts to the extent that will justify the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.
V. A NEW WAY FORWARD
No matter what side of the general jurisdiction debate one falls on,
it is easy to see that a new formulation for general jurisdiction is needed.278
Many of the problems that Justice Sotomayor identified in her Daimler
concurrence are indeed arising across the corporate litigation landscape in
this country.279 But in addition to the injustices of current general
jurisdiction jurisprudence, the current framework is wholly inconsistent
with the theory of general jurisdiction articulated in International Shoe.280
277. Here, look to the guidance of Hertz Corp. v. Friend and use the “nerve center”
test. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–94 (2010).
278. See Grossi, supra note 16, at 618.
279. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763–73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
280. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1945).
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This section proposes a new rule for general jurisdiction and then explains
the foreseeable impact and justification for such a rule.
General jurisdiction should be defined as follows:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant
via general jurisdiction if the following elements are
satisfied: (1) the state’s relevant long-arm statute permits
the exercise of jurisdiction; and (2) the defendant’s contacts
evidence a continuous and systematic utilization of the
benefits and protections of the forum state to such a degree
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
This rule accomplishes several goals. First, it requires compliance
with a state’s long-arm statute, which admittedly is an infrequent issue.
Second, it utilizes the contacts inquiry first established by the landmark
decision of International Shoe.281 Third, it incorporates the reasonableness
inquiry of “fair play and substantial justice” that is evidenced in all personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence.282 Fourth, it focuses on the extent of the
defendant’s use of the benefits and protections of the forum state. The
thinking goes that if a defendant is going to take advantage of a state’s
amenities and opportunities, it is only fair that such a defendant be subject
to suit in the courts of that state. This is called reciprocal fairness.
Such a rule is supported by several concerns voiced in academia
and case law regarding properly formulated personal jurisdiction principles.
This rule does not ignore the costs associated with a defendant litigating in
a foreign forum; rather, the fairness rationale picks up this consideration
and includes it in the court’s analysis.283 Furthermore, this test focuses the
analysis away from the defendant’s ease of litigation and towards the
plaintiff’s need for relief. Such a shift has been advocated in the world of
legal academia.284 Also, the Daimler decision has inordinately shrunk the
scope of jurisdictional discovery, thus preventing plaintiffs from finding

281. Id. at 316–17.
282. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (“The canonical opinion in this area remains
International Shoe . . . .”) (internal citations omitted); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918–19 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.
873, 880 (2011); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
283. See Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245,
250 (2014).
284. See Kate Bonacorsi, Not at Home With “At-Home” Jurisdiction, 37 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1821, 1853–54 (2014).
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possible connection between a defendant and a forum state.285 All of these
concerns lend credence to the new rule proposed in this article.
CONCLUSION
“The U.S. Supreme Court effected a sea change in general
jurisdiction jurisprudence on Jan. 14, 2014, when it issued its decision in
Daimler AG v. Bauman.”286 As such, many consider American personal
jurisdiction law to be in disarray.287 The Supreme Court has strayed from
the principles of general jurisdiction laid out in International Shoe and
Perkins, stripping general jurisdiction of its power and relegating it to a
minute position within personal jurisdiction doctrine. Although it is still
possible to meet the strict Daimler test using lower court decisions and
internet contacts, a new test is needed. Such a test would focus on the
plaintiff’s right to a remedy and the ultimate fairness of exercising
jurisdiction. Although this test is still not a bright line, and still factintensive, such is the nature of personal jurisdiction. If the scope of general
jurisdiction is opened up, the dangers of corporate shadow-games effecting
personal jurisdiction will be lessened. And ideally, injured plaintiffs may be
able to have their day in court against the parties that are actually
responsible rather than a shallow-pocketed subsidiary.

285. Jamin S. Soderstrom, The Shrinking Scope of Jurisdictional Discovery, 78 TEX.
B.J. 20, 21 (2015).
286. Id. at 20.
287. Klerman, supra note 283, at 245.

